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The concept of social investment has gained increasing traction among European Union policymakers, as a strategy to reconcile the 
goals of employment, growth, and social inclusion. 
In recent years, however, scholars have criticized 
the social investment approach for not being able 
to achieve its intended distributional consequences 
and have raised doubts about whether the goals of 
increasing employment and decreasing poverty are 
reconcilable. 
This paper argues that distinguishing between the 
‘Nordic approach’ and the ‘Third Way approach’ 
to social investment is key both for describing 
policy developments and for understanding the 
relationships between social investment policies, 
employment and poverty. 
Based on an exploration of recent trends in social 
investment policies, employment and poverty in 
Sweden, we propose that the recent noticeable 
increase in poverty can best be accounted for by 
changes in social insurance policy and tax policy 
that represent a shift from the Nordic approach to 
the Third Way approach, whereas an ‘employment 
vs. poverty’ trade-off is mitigated by the sustained 
presence of a compressed wage structure. A set of 
panel data analyses on 24 European countries over 
the last decade provide preliminary evidence that 
these mechanisms extend also beyond Sweden. 
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1. Introduction
Over the past 15 years, the concept of ‘social 
investment’ has gradually gained traction among 
European Union policymakers. Central strategies 
and policy agendas, such as the Lisbon Agenda 
of 2000, the Europe 2020 strategy of 2010 and 
the Social Investment Package of 2013, are all 
manifestations of this. Here social investment 
oriented policies aimed at enhancing the productive 
capacity and employment of the population have 
been identified as key elements in a strategy to 
increase growth and competitiveness as well as to 
reduce poverty and social exclusion. 
The extent to which a social investment approach 
has been adopted “varies very widely” across 
the EU Member States (Bouget et al., 2015: 6). 
What is clear, however, is that in recent years, the 
approach has attracted much scholarly attention, 
including criticism from a number of perspectives. 
Perhaps most notably, analysts have questioned 
whether social investment oriented policies achieve 
their intended distributional consequences, and 
have raised doubts about the idea underpinning 
the approach, i.e. that the goals of increasing 
employment and reducing poverty are reconcilable 
(Cantillon, 2011; Corluy and Vandenbroucke, 2014). 
The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the 
feasibility of the social investment approach as a 
strategy of promoting employment and poverty 
reduction. This will be done in three steps: In the 
first step (section 2), we revisit the critique of the 
social investment approach and explore how it 
applies differently to two different versions of the 
social investment approach identified in the previous 
literature (e.g. Morel et al., 2012); the ‘Nordic 
approach’ (cf. Esping-Andersen et al, 2002) and the 
‘Third Way approach’ pioneered by Giddens (1998). 
The two approaches vary not only in their historical 
roots but also in some central values and policy 
prescriptions. Therefore, it is argued, it is important 
to distinguish between them, when describing and 
explaining social investment policy developments 
as well as when assessing the achievements and 
shortcomings of the social investment approach. 
In the second step (section 3), we demonstrate 
the usefulness of this distinction not only for 
characterizing recent developments of social 
investment oriented policies in Sweden but also 
for understanding the relationship between social 
investment policies, employment and poverty. 
The section includes an empirical analysis of 
Sweden where we review recent trends in social 
investment policies, employment, and poverty. 
Although the past decade has seen increases in 
both employment and poverty, we question the 
notion of an ‘employment vs. poverty’ trade-off in 
the Swedish context of a relatively high degree of 
wage compression. Rather, we argue, the increase 
in poverty is best explained by precisely those 
policy changes which represent a shift from the 
Nordic approach of social investments to the Third 
Way approach; namely retrenchments in the social 
insurance systems and the introduction of a broad 
earned income tax credit (EITC). 
In a third step (section 4), we analyze a short panel 
data set on at-risk-of-poverty rates in 24 European 
countries to make a first assessment of whether our 
arguments are transferrable outside the Swedish 
context. Our estimations suggest, in line with our 
argument, that employment is positively related to 
poverty only in the context of low wage bargaining 
centralization (implying a low degree of wage 
compression). We also find that poverty is negatively 
related to the replacement rate of unemployment 
benefits and unrelated to incremental changes in 
social investment expenditure.
In the concluding ‘Discussion’ we highlight the 
potential merits of social investments by pointing to 
the critical elements of such as strategy and what it 
requires in terms of institutional complementarities. 
2. Approaches to social investment, and the 
critique
In this section, which draws heavily on Cronert 
and Palme (forthcoming), we elaborate on the 
distinction between the two versions of the social 
investment approach, and we begin by tracing its 
historical roots.
2.1 The origins of the Nordic approach to social 
investment
The origins of the social investment approach can 
be traced back to the 1930s, to the Great Depression, 
and to the falling birth rates – that in Sweden 
came to be labelled the ‘Crisis of the Population 
Question’. In the midst of these crises, Alva and 
Gunnar Myrdal began to develop an approach to 
social policy aimed at supporting production and 
reproduction, which opened up for an investment 
perspective on social policy (Morel et al., 2012). 
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Falling fertility was seen as an economic problem, 
in the context of increasing costs for households 
raising children, and with social consequences 
for those who could not afford to have children. 
Myrdal and Myrdal advocated policies that would 
combine direct economic support to families with 
children with indirect support for housing, as well 
as the provision of opportunities for female labor 
force participation. The population question was 
formulated not only in terms of the “quantity” but 
also in terms of the “quality” (health and education) 
of the population, i.e. the social conditions for 
human capital formation.
The Myrdals were also concerned with economic 
growth and productivity. This is true also for 
the post-World War II continuation of the social 
investment approach in Sweden. Part of this 
continuation is closely intertwined with the Myrdal 
agenda, even if the actual policy implementation 
came with a delay of (about four) decades. Another 
part of it developed in a different context and was 
influenced by other actors in the labor movement, 
namely the trade union economists Gösta Rehn 
and Rudolf Meidner (Morel et al., 2012). The 
Rehn-Meidner Model of economic policy was 
designed to support a kind of Schumpeterian 
creative destruction and transformation of the 
economy, while at the same time promoting 
‘social construction’ with selective but massive 
encompassing active labor market policy (ALMP) 
measures, including re-training of the labor force to 
make workers fit for the new economic structures 
(cf. Bonoli, 2010). These investments in education 
and training of the labor force can no doubt be 
labelled as ‘social’ due to their distributional 
properties and inclusive effects (cf. Nelson and 
Stephens, 2012). The Rehn-Meidner Model was also 
underpinned by a centralized, egalitarian wage 
policy, meant to shift resources towards the more 
productive sectors of the economy while stimulating 
consumer demand and, in turn, labor demand and 
employment. 
The expansion and universalization of the education 
system which began in the late 1950s and continued 
gradually throughout the post-war period were also 
clearly ‘social’ in nature (Lindensjö and Lundgren, 
2014). Next, beginning in the 1960s, the approach 
was complemented with adult education under the 
label ‘life-long education’. This further geared the 
regular education systems towards combining social 
and economic objectives. 
While Keynesianism grew in importance and 
dominated as an economic paradigm in the 
Western hemisphere until the late 1970s, it may be 
argued that following Keynes’ primary concerns, 
the function of public spending was mainly a 
macroeconomic balancing mechanism rather than 
an instrument for reducing inequalities (cf. Sen, 
2009) or an instrument for ‘social investment’. 
The focus on female labor market participation 
and gender equality is something which belongs 
to the Myrdal imprint on the Swedish version of 
Keynesianism rather than (male) mainstream 
Keynesianism (Hobson, 2006). From the 1970s, 
the various components of what can be labelled 
the ‘dual-earner model’ gradually came into place; 
including separate taxation of spouse income 
to improve incentives for a second earner, and 
expansion of cradle-to-grave social services enabling 
women to combine family responsibilities with paid 
work in the expanding public sector as well as in the 
private sector. These services were vital to enable 
individuals and society to harvest the investment in 
women’s human capital that had taken place during 
the first post-war decades and that would continue 
to expand (Palme, 1999).
Two other important features of the Nordic 
approach to social investment are the idea that 
widespread employment and decent wages are 
the best guarantees for avoiding poverty and 
other socio-economic ills, and the notion of 
complementarities between ‘demanding’ and 
‘enabling’ social policies to this end. Thus, clarifying 
the responsibility for individuals to search for, move 
to, and take up new employment (i.e. ‘demanding 
social policies’) became integral to the Nordic 
social investment approach as a complement to 
education and training programs (‘enabling social 
policies’) (Palme, 1999). In the realm of labor 
market policy, the basic formula, at least before 
the crisis of the 1990s, was to allocate 75 percent 
of the overall expenditure to ‘active’ labor market 
measures (ALMP) and 25 percent to ‘passive’ 
measures (unemployment benefits) (OECD, 2016a). 
Still, social transfers were acknowledged as a 
potential productive factor and an important tool 
for preventing poverty and inequality as well as 
depletion of human capital, and it was recognized 
that unemployment benefits may serve to reward 
formal labor force attachment, improve matching, 
cater to macroeconomic stabilization and promote 
economic restructuring (Palme et al., 2009). Family-
related benefits are important for reducing child 
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poverty, and are even a precondition for social 
investments oriented towards children; parental 
leave insurance provides a second income for 
families with infants, and child care benefits allow 
for a second earner also in families with small 
children (Ferrarini, 2006).
The social policy agenda that was formulated in 
Sweden, starting in the 1930s and continuing in the 
post-war period, was based on the core assumption 
that the trade-off between equality and efficiency 
can be bridged by social policies that also have 
economic objectives and by economic policies 
that also have social objectives. Thus, fighting 
poverty was about enhancing the productivity 
and employment of the population, and counter-
cyclical policies were about fighting poverty and 
inequality. Redistribution was seen as an irrigation 
system (G. Myrdal), not a leaky bucket (Okun) (cf. 
Korpi, 1985). The goal was equality and not mere 
poverty reduction (Erikson, 1993), and equality 
not only between social classes but also between 
the two genders. The means were universal and 
life-long education, cradle-to-grave social services 
(particularly child care, but also elderly care), active 
labor market policy (particularly training and 
mobility grants), combined with earnings-related 
sickness insurance and parental leave benefits, as 
well as unemployment benefits to avoid human 
capital depletion and cushion job transitions, 
and centralized wage bargaining to promote wage 
compression. At this point, however, it should 
be noted that wage bargaining structures do not 
figure as prominently as they deserve in the social 
investment literature. In this paper, we take steps in 
the direction to remedy this omission.
2.2. The Nordic approach meets the Third Way
The description above serves to facilitate the 
distinction between the Nordic approach to social 
investment and the so called `Third Way’ approach 
to welfare reform, pioneered by Anthony Giddens 
(1998). The Third Way approach was developed 
around the same time that the concept of social 
investment started to gain traction at the EU-level in 
connection to the development of the Lisbon Agenda 
of the year 2000, and to some extent in parallel 
to the work of Esping-Andersen and colleagues 
who were inspired by the Nordic approach. This 
resulted in a report to the Belgian Presidency of 
the EU during the fall of 2001, later to be published 
with the title: Why We Need a New Welfare State 
(Esping-Andersen et al., 2002). This is of relevance 
not only because of the many similarities between 
the approaches, not least the focus on the supply 
side of the labor market and on investments in 
skill formation, but also because of their important 
differences.
More specifically, the approaches differ in their 
understanding of what constitutes productive and 
unproductive social expenditures, in the roles they 
ascribe to social policy and to civil society actors, in 
their view of equality, and how they appear to want 
to strike a balance between rights and responsibilities 
(Morel et al., 2012; cf. Andersson, 2009). Where 
Giddens emphasizes the moral hazards and 
unproductive character of unemployment benefits 
and similar cash transfers, Esping-Andersen sees the 
productive values of such programs. Where Giddens 
values the incentives created by inequalities, 
Esping-Andersen problematizes the effects of lack 
of equality. Where Giddens promotes a ‘positive 
welfare society’, the Nordic approach emphasizes 
the role of the state. On a discursive level and with 
respect to rights and responsibilities, Andersson 
(2009) identified illuminating differences between 
the two approaches by comparing Swedish Social 
Democrats and New Labour in the United Kingdom. 
One way to interpret her rich analysis is to say that 
whereas New Labour, inspired by the Third Way, 
tilted the balance between rights and responsibilities 
in the direction of responsibilities, in Sweden that 
kind of tilt did not occur until the Social Democrats 
lost the election in 20061.
Precisely because the polysemic nature of the 
concept of ‘social investment’ (Jenson, 2010) has 
enabled it to accommodate these rather different 
approaches to social and labor market policy reform, 
it is important for researchers to keep the two apart 
analytically. This is true not only when describing 
and explaining policy developments, but also when 
assessing the achievements and shortcomings of 
the social investment approach. In what follows, we 
elaborate further on this point.
1  This being said, New Labour achieved a number of 
significant real world policy advancements by investing 
in education and in expanding child care programs which 
facilitated female employment (Stewart, 2009; Stewart and 
Obolenskaya, 2016). But in contrast to the ‘Nordic Model’, 
traditional social insurance programs were left on a minimal 
level (Palme et al, 2009) and a wage formation model that 
would directly prevent in-work-poverty was also lacking (see 
below).
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2.3. Social investment, redistribution and the trade-
off between employment and equality
In recent scholarly debates on the merits of the 
social investment approach, it is the distributive 
consequences of its policy recipe, in particular its 
consequences for poverty, which have received 
the most skepticism2. A number of factors have 
been brought up, which might have a detrimental 
effect on poverty, and which are typically held to 
be intrinsic to the social investment approach. 
However, some of these concerns primarily have 
bearing on either the particular principles or policy 
prescriptions linked to the Third Way approach or 
the consequences of ‘activation’ reforms introduced 
across Europe over the past two decades; most of 
which have had very little investment content3 (De la 
Porte and Jacobsson, 2012).
First, it has been suggested that because the 
consumption of those public services associated 
with the social investment approach are typically 
work-related and earnings-related, such services 
have a less redistributive profile than traditional 
cash transfers, giving way to ‘Matthew effects’ 
and increasing inequalities in social investment 
oriented states (Cantillon, 2011). Second, it has been 
suggested that the shift on the political agenda from 
passive income support policies to active investment 
policies has resulted in a reallocation of resources 
away from the more redistributive policy areas to the 
less so. Third, it has been argued that the discursive 
emphasis on ‘making work pay’ has justified, and 
perhaps even necessitated, a re-commodification 
of citizens by means of retrenchment of benefits, 
with detrimental consequences for the more 
vulnerable (Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 
2011). Fourth, it has been argued that while on an 
aggregate level these consequences could have been 
mitigated in case the policies were successful in 
moving unemployed people into employment, the 
proportion of people living in jobless households 
2  Two other important strands of criticism concern its (lack 
of) commitment to equalizing power relations between 
women and men (see e.g. Jenson, 2009) and its inherent 
trade-off between imposing negative economic incentives and 
establishing a close monitoring of people’s willingness to work 
(see Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx, 2011).
3  To be sure, some concerns have also been raised about the 
Nordic approach in particular; primarily with regard to its 
economic and political sustainability. We briefly address these 
issues in the ‘Discussion’ section of this paper.
has hardly decreased in the EU in the wake of the 
employment and inclusion strategies, despite rising 
overall employment rates. This has raised doubts 
about whether the goals of increasing employment 
and decreasing poverty underpinning the social 
investment approach are reconcilable (Cantillon, 
2011; Corluy and Vandenbroucke, 2014; de Beer, 
2007). 
Turning first to the distributive profile of the services, 
most evidence so far seems to suggest that on an 
aggregate level, social investment oriented services 
are redistributive in an egalitarian direction – 
although findings vary with respect to the extent. 
For instance, Esping-Andersen and Myles (2009: 
654) found that services are generally redistributive 
but less so than some cash transfers, whereas Verbist 
and Matsaganis (2014) found that the poverty-
reducing effect of services is much larger than the 
one of cash transfers to the working age population. 
Using concentration coefficients, they show that this 
is because although the design of cash transfers in 
most cases make them more oriented toward lower 
income groups, services are much more important 
in size. Nelson and Stephens (2012) find that a range 
of social investment oriented services are positively 
related to the consequent level of general skills – 
especially in the bottom half of the skill distribution 
– and to both the employment levels in general and 
employment in knowledge-intensive services.
The distributional profile of services seems to 
depend on the design of specific policies, the 
context in which they are introduced, and how 
they are combined to achieve institutional 
complementarities. With respect to childcare 
policies, this is the conclusion from, for instance, 
studies by Vaalavuo (2011) and Van Lancker and 
Ghysels (2012). With respect to ALMP, Gingrich 
and Ansell (2015) as well as Cronert (2017) argued 
that these do not have pre-defined distributional 
profiles, but can be targeted at different groups by 
different actors. Moreover, in order to understand 
the distributional effects of services, we also need 
to consider the revenue side of the programs in the 
analysis, as was observed by Åberg (1989), illustrated 
by Rothstein (1998) and more recently emphasized 
by Whiteford (2008).
In sum, existing evidence seems to suggest that 
in general, the distributional profile of social 
investment oriented services, as defined in the 
previous section, is a function of their content and 
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targeting, and of the national context in which they 
are implemented, but that their potential is there.
The second and the third concerns, labelled 
resource competition and re-commodification by 
Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011), warrant 
a recollection of the distinction between the 
Nordic and the Third Way approaches to social 
investment. Whereas for Giddens (1998), welfare 
state restructuring is indeed about achieving a shift 
from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ social policies, the Nordic 
approach stresses that ‘social promotion’ must 
be combined with ‘social protection’ (Hemerijck, 
2012b). Thus, on an ideational basis, the resource 
competition and re-commodification critiques are 
primarily relevant to the Third Way approach4. 
Turning to the empirical thrust of this critique, 
Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011) concluded 
in their analysis of change in social expenditure 
over two decades in 14 countries, that pressure 
on social budgets came from healthcare and 
pensions rather than from social investment 
programs. Along the same lines, the results from 
Nikolai’s (2012) and Vandenbroucke and Diris’ 
(2014) studies of long-term social expenditures 
contradict the idea of a shift from passive to active 
spending. Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011) 
did not rule out, however, that given the context 
of relatively tight budgetary constraints for many 
European governments, the ‘making work pay’ 
component of social investment may have justified 
and reinforced pressures for retrenchment in 
the field of unemployment benefits in order to 
strengthen work incentives. We agree, but suggest 
that such a justification would necessarily hinge on 
a selective reading of the social investment approach 
as outlined in this paper, given the important 
productive role it assigns to unemployment benefits.
When addressing the fourth concern, regarding 
the poverty-reducing capacity of social investment 
policies, specifically the ‘employment vs. poverty 
trade-off’, it is again important to distinguish 
between the Nordic and the Third Way approaches 
4  That being said, we acknowledge that both approaches 
explicitly favor labor market participation over (long-term) de-
commodification. Orloff’s (1993: 318) remark that “For many 
women and others excluded from paid labor, commodification 
– that is, obtaining a position in the paid labor force – is in fact 
potentially emancipatory” illustrates this reasoning.
to social investment. We agree that an even 
distribution of work is key to poverty reduction 
(Corluy and Vandenbroucke, 2014). Indeed, this is 
another reason to stress the importance of including 
the provision of enabling services such as child care 
to households with low work intensity. However, 
that might not be enough to escape the trade-off. 
Atkinson (2010) outlines two potential strategies for 
achieving high employment among workers with 
low productivity: 1) lowering the cost of job creation 
(which generally requires mobilization of public 
resources) and 2) reducing reservation wages by 
reducing the generosity of social protection. While 
the second strategy is less expensive, it may come at 
the cost of increasing the number of working poor, 
i.e. if reservation wages are set below the poverty 
line5. 
Posed with Atkinson’s dilemma, most proponents 
of social investment would probably argue that 
the trade-off can be mitigated to the extent that 
investments in human capital in universal education 
systems, combined with targeted ALMP, succeed 
in raising productivity in the lower end of the 
distribution. Second, proponents of the Nordic 
approach would go on to point out that the extent 
to which increased employment leads to increased 
poverty is likely to depend on the degree of wage 
compression. If statutory or collectively bargained 
entry-level wages are high relative to the median 
wage the prevalence of in-work poverty is likely to 
be limited. Whereas the influential ‘Trilemma of 
the Service Economy’ (Iversen and Wren, 1998) 
suggests that, in the post-industrial era, wage 
compression inhibits employment growth in the 
first place, proponents of the Nordic approach 
would tend to agree more with Wren’s et al. 
revised version of the trilemma, which suggests 
that “[t]he possibility exists for high productivity, 
internationally traded service sectors to take over 
from manufacturing sectors as the dynamic drivers 
of employment expansion in the post-industrial 
economy, reducing the need to rely on low relative 
wages at the bottom of the earnings distribution to 
5  This can be illustrated by the German experience with the 
Hartz reforms and the expansion of low-paid ‘mini-jobs’ in the 
first half of the 2000s. Between 2000 and 2010, employment 
in the ages 20-64 increased by a notable 6.1 percentage points 
(Eurostat, 2016b). In 2010, however, the overall at-risk-of-
poverty rate at 50 % (60 %) of the median income was 9.6 % 
(16.4 %), which amounts to a 26 % (29 %) increase over said 
period (LIS, 2015).
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facilitate private service employment expansion” 
(2013: 109). Our main point here is that to the extent 
that employment increases, it should primarily fail 
to reduce poverty if taking place in a context of high 
wage dispersion. This point, we argue, is important 
to bear in mind when analyzing and making 
inferences to the recent trends in social investment 
oriented policies, employment and poverty in 
Sweden, which are in focus in the empirical section 
that follows.
3. Social investment, employment and poverty: 
Revisiting the relationships in the Swedish case
In this section, we review recent trends in social 
investment policies, employment, and poverty 
in Sweden, and argue that the recent increase in 
poverty is best explained by precisely those policy 
changes which represent a shift from the Nordic 
approach of social investments to the Third Way 
approach. 
3.1. Social investment trends in Sweden: From the 
Nordic approach to the Third Way?
In the mid-1980s, around the time that our 
historical outline of the development of the Nordic 
approach to social investment ends, Sweden was 
clearly the most social investment oriented country 
in Europe, judging from OECD social expenditure 
data for that period, (OECD 2016a). These data show 
that compared to the EU-15 average, Sweden spent 
over three times more of its GDP on what can be 
labelled ‘new’, or social investment oriented, policy 
areas; i.e. parental leave, elderly care and childcare 
services, and active labor market policy (Meeusen 
and Nys, 2012). In what follows, we look closer at 
the developments in these and other relevant policy 
fields that have taken place in Sweden over the 
three decades that followed. In brief, our mapping 
suggests that gradually over the period, and more 
distinctly during the last decade, Sweden has turned 
away from the Nordic approach, towards a Third 
Way approach.
Consider first Figure 1, which tracks social 
expenditure developments over the past three 
decades for the seven policy areas which Meeusen 
and Nys (2012) classify as ‘old’ (health care, 
old age benefits, and other benefits) and ‘new’ 
(parental leave, elderly care, child care, and ALMP), 
respectively.
At a first glance, the story to be told about social 
expenditure in Sweden over these years seems to be 
one of overall stability rather than one of important 
change. The 25-year period between 1985 and 
2011 saw one marked increase in total spending 
in the early 1990s. This increase coincided with 
the onset of the severe economic crisis in 1992. It 
was understandably driven more by the fact that 
GDP decreased in 1991, 1992 and 1993 than by any 
intentional increase in ‘welfare state effort’ (even 
though it is evident that the increased number of 
unemployed spurred expenditure expansion in 
real terms both for cash transfers and for ALMP). 
There is a similar, although smaller, bump at the 
end of the period, as Sweden saw a negative GDP 
growth in both 2008 and 2009, in the wake of yet 
another global financial crisis. Seen over the full 
period, the overall change is a modest 5 percent 
increase in social expenditure, up from 28.7 percent 
of GDP in 1985 to 30.2 percent in 2011. Expenditure 
on education is not included in Figure 1 because 
comparable data are only available from 1997 to 
2011. These reinforce the pattern of overall stability. 
With no discernible trend, expenditure fluctuated 
around a mean of 4.1 (± 0.3) percent of GDP for 
primary and secondary education, and 1.6 (± 0.1) 
percent of GDP for tertiary education.
However, some important changes in the 
composition of social expenditure deserve attention. 
First, taken together, ‘new’ or social investment 
oriented, expenditure has increased by one third 
since the mid-1980s (up from 6.1 percent of GDP to 
8.2 in 2011), whereas expenditure on “other benefits”, 
i.e. unemployment compensation, early retirement, 
social assistance, paid sick leave, family allowances 
etc., is down 25 percent since 1985 and more than 
50 percent since its peak in 1993. Second, among the 
‘new’ policy areas, parental leave, elderly care and 
childcare has increased whereas ALMP has seen a 
steady and sizeable drop. Third, a decomposition of 
the ALMP expenditure, not visible in Figure 1, tells 
of a profound shift of focus of the ALMP portfolio, 
from skill formation to employment assistance (or 
‘work first’). Training programs, which in 1985 
amounted to 0.7 percent of GDP (or 35 percent of 
ALMP), were down to 0.1 percent of GDP (or 8 
percent of ALMP) in 2011. By contrast, employment 
incentives and labor market services – aimed at 
promoting labor market entry – increased from 
0.6 to 0.9 percent of GDP over the period, and now 
accounts for 75 percent of the ALMP portfolio.
Expenditure on a social policy program can be 
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divided into two components; the average number 
of beneficiaries and the average expenditure 
per beneficiary. And to the extent that the latter 
indicator can be seen as a proxy for policy ‘effort’, 
the picture of the investment content in the social 
expenditure becomes somewhat gloomier. Figure 
2 plots the average public expenditure as the share 
of one ppm of GDP per beneficiary in seven policy 
areas over the periods that the available data permit. 
When it comes to education, preschool (age 1–6) and 
compulsory school (age 7–15) are the only schooling 
types that have not seen a drop in expenditure 
per pupil since the mid-1990s. Upper secondary 
school has seen gradually decreasing expenditure 
per student throughout the studied period and a 
more marked dilution has taken place in tertiary 
education. The only schooling type that has seen 
a slight increase since the mid-2000s is municipal 
higher education, yet expenditure per student was 
still lower in 2012 than in the mid-1990s.
The increase and subsequent sharp decrease in 
ALMP expenditure per program participant during 
the 2000s is paradoxical given the gradual overall 
decrease displayed in Figure 1. The bulk of the 
increase in the per-program-participant expenditure 
can be accounted for by two expensive programs 
– a subsidized sabbatical year (Friår) and a job 
creation scheme (Plusjobb). These were enacted by 
the social democratic government in 2005–2006, 
and immediately revoked by the center-right 
government that came into power following the 
2006 election. The introduction of these programs 
coincided with an economic upturn during which 
the overall number of ALMP program participants 
dropped; hence the relative stability of total ALMP 
expenditure during those years. 
With regard to public expenditure on 
unemployment benefits, Figure 2 demonstrates that 
the drop in total expenditure on “other benefits” 
displayed in Figure 1 is not only a matter of 
shrinking numbers of benefits claimants, but that 
public expenditure per unemployed has decreased 
sharply since the early 2000s. Further, it can also be 
noted in this context that the adequacy rate of social 
assistance benefits has lagged behind the real growth 
of the economy. In the early 1990s it used to be close 
to 60 percent of the median income; by 2009 it had 
dropped below 50 percent (Kuivalainen and Nelson, 
2010). 
Three developments that are not reflected in the 
expenditure data are worth mentioning here. First, 
whereas the enabling dimension of the Swedish 
active labor market policy regime, expressed, 
for instance, in terms of the share of the ALMP 
portfolio that is devoted to labor market training 
programs, has clearly been pulled back, its 
demanding dimension, that is, the requirements 
placed on jobless individuals, has been strengthened. 
Overall, early enrolment into ALMP programs, 
notably in low-cost job search assistance programs 
but also in more costly wage subsidy programs has 
increased. The overall share of registered employed 
who are enrolled in a program was up from 42 
percent in 1999 to 60 percent in 2013 (Cronert, 
2015). In addition, the strictness of the sanctions 
imposed on unemployment benefit recipients if 
they fail to comply with the program requirements 
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Figure 1. Social expenditure on “old” and “new” social policy areas, Sweden, 1985 – 2011
Public and private social expenditure as percentage of GDP. The categorization follows the framework 
developed by Meeusen and Nys (2012). Source: OECD (2016a). 
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or reject a suitable job offer have been increased 
stepwise since the mid-1990s (Knotz, 2016). 
Second, the Jobbskatteavdrag, a general, non-
means-tested earned income tax credit (EITC) first 
introduced in 2007, and expanded four times since, 
has substantially lowered income taxes for workers 
across the wage distribution6. In 2011, the average 
income tax rate for a single person at 67 % of average 
earnings with no child was 15 percent; that is 6.5 
percentage points lower than in 2006 (OECD, 2014). 
While these tax reforms have increased disposable 
income for all working people, and arguably 
increased employment and extended the tax base7, 
they are “far from self-financed” in terms of their 
net effects on revenue and spending (Erickson et 
6  Additional (though smaller) tax reductions come from 
the abolishment of the inheritance tax (2005), the wealth tax 
(2007), and the state-level real-estate tax (2008) (see Svallfors, 
2016).
7  Simulations have estimated that the EITC has increased 
the number of working hours by between 1.5 and 2.5 percent 
(e.g. Ericson et al., 2009). Yet, these estimations could not 
be confirmed in an empirical evaluation by the Institute for 
Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) (Edmark et al., 2012). 
Also, public awareness of the EITC is poor, which implies that 
the theorized incentives might not live up to their full potential 
(Flood et al., 2013).
al., 2009: 1). As a result, resources available for 
public expenditure have significantly decreased. For 
2014, the size of the EITC was 2.4 percent of GDP 
(SEK 95B; € 10.7B) (Regeringen, 2012; 2013). As an 
illustration, this amount is roughly equivalent to 
3.5 times the budget devoted to ALMP programs 
(Regeringen, 2013).
The third development concerns minimum wages. 
In Sweden, these are not regulated by law, but subject 
to sector-specific negotiations between employers 
and trade unions. Settlements on minimum wages 
are found in the numerous collective agreements, 
which in total cover approximately 90 percent 
of the Swedish workforce8. Data for seven of the 
largest collective agreements signed by unions that 
make up about 74 percent of the total membership 
of the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(LO) indicate that, in each settlement, gross real 
minimum wages have grown faster than the real 
median disposable income over the past two 
decades. These data, compiled by Skedinger (2010) 
and completed by the authors, show a 2.3 percent 
8  Whereas workers who are not covered by a collective 
agreement are typically not entitled to occupational pensions 
and other benefits, their wages tend to match collectively 
agreed levels.
Figure 2. Public expenditure per beneficiary in seven policy areas, Sweden, 1992 – 2012. Public expenditure 
expressed as share of one part per million of GDP per beneficiary. For tertiary education, the average cost for a full 
time, fully performing student in a technical track is presented. For ALMP programs, average cost per participant 
and year is presented. Costs and participants for programs for disabled individuals are omitted. For unemployment 
benefits, average cost per unemployed and year is presented. The indicator includes public expenditures related to 
unemployment insurance and ‘activity support’.
 
Sources: Arbetsförmedlingen (2000–2012; 2014), Swedish National Agency for Education (2014), Swedish Association 
of University Teachers (2012).
Axel Cronert & Joakim Palme 
Global Challenges • Working Paper Series / No. 4
9
or reject a suitable job offer have been increased 
stepwise since the mid-1990s (Knotz, 2016). 
Second, the Jobbskatteavdrag, a general, non-
mea s-test d earned income tax credit (EITC) first 
introduced in 2007, and expanded four times since, 
has substantially lowered income taxes for workers 
across the wage distribution6. In 2011, the average 
income tax rate for a single person at 67 % of average 
earnings with no child was 15 percent; that is 6.5 
percentage points lower than in 2006 (OECD, 2014). 
While these tax reforms have increased disposable 
income for all working people, and arguably 
increased employment and extended the tax base7, 
they are “far from self-financed” in terms of their 
net effects on revenue and spending (Erickson et 
6  Additional (though smaller) tax reductions come from 
the abolishment of the inheritance tax (2005), the wealth tax 
(2007), and the state-level real-estate tax (2008) (see Svallfors, 
2016).
7  Simulations have estimated that the EITC has increased 
the number of working hours by between 1.5 and 2.5 percent 
(e.g. Ericson et al., 2009). Yet, these estimations could not 
be confirmed in an empirical evaluation by the Institute for 
Labour Market P licy Evaluation (IFAU) (Edmark et al., 2012). 
Also, public awareness of the EITC is poor, which implies that 
the theo ized incentives might not live up to their full potential 
(Flood et al., 2013).
al., 2009: 1). As a result, resources available for 
public expenditure have significantly decre sed. For 
2014, the siz  of the EITC w s 2.4 percent of GDP 
(SEK 95B; € 10.7B) (Regeringen, 2012; 013). As an 
illustration, this amount is roughly equivalent to 
3.5 times the budget devoted to ALMP programs 
(Regeringen, 2013).
The third development concerns minimum wages. 
In Sweden, these are not regulated by law, but subject 
to sector-specific negotiations between employers 
and trade unions. Settlements on minimum wages 
are found in the numerous collective agreements, 
which in total cover approximately 90 percent 
of the Swedish workforce8. Data for seven of the 
largest collective agreements signed by unions that 
make up about 74 percent of the total membership 
of the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(LO) indicate that, in each settlemen , gross real 
minimum wag s have grown faster than the real 
median disposable income over the past two 
decades. These data, compiled by Skedinger (2010) 
and completed by the authors, show a 2.3 percent 
8  Whereas workers who are not covered by a collective 
agreement are typically not entitled to occupational pensions 
and other benefits, their wages tend to match collectively 
agreed levels.
Figure 2. Public expenditure per beneficiary in seven policy areas, Sweden, 1992 – 2012. Public expenditure 
expressed as share of one part per million of GDP per beneficiary. For tertiary education, the average cost for a full 
time, fully performing student in a technical track is presented. For ALMP programs, average cost per participant 
and year is presented. Costs and participants for programs for disabled individuals are omitted. For unemployment 
be fits, verage cost per unemployed and year is presented. The indicator includes public expenditures related to 
un ent insurance and ‘activity support’.
 
So r : rbetsförmedlingen (200 –201 ; 2014), Swedish Nation l Agency for Education (2014), Swedish Association 
of niversity Teachers (2012).
10
Global Challenges • Working Paper Series / No. 4
Approaches to Social Investment and Their Implications for Poverty in Sweden and the European Union
annual growth rate of gross real minimum wages, 
averaged over the agreements for 1995 – 20119. The 
corresponding figure for the real median disposable 
income is 1.5 percent (Statistics Sweden, 2016). What 
this implies is a reduction in the share of annual 
full-time work needed to yield a disposable income 
that exceeds the poverty line. For these seven 
sectors, our calculations show an average drop from 
98 to 76 percent full-time work between 2000 and 
201110. In short; the wage developments, together 
with the aforementioned tax policy changes, have 
been ‘making work pay’.
To sum up this section, it has been shown that 
despite a largely unchanged scope of total social 
policy expenditure, Sweden has seen a clear 
recasting of its social and labor market policy 
portfolio. Policies to promote high labor force 
participation, such as childcare and elderly care 
services, employment assistance programs, benefit 
sanctions, and the EITC have been expanded, 
whereas the investment content of the policy 
portfolio has been diluted and the social protection 
systems for the working-age population have 
been dismantled. This can best be described as a 
movement away from the Nordic social investment 
approach that characterized Sweden in the post-
war era, towards a Third Way approach to social 
investment. This shift, in turn, is important to keep 
in mind as we now turn to explore how employment, 
household work intensity and poverty in Sweden 
have developed in recent years. 
3.2. Trends in employment and poverty in Sweden: 
Is there a trade-off?
Bearing in mind the policy changes described above, 
we now turn to explore trends in employment, 
household work intensity and poverty in Sweden 
between 2004 and 2014 (the full set of years for 
which comparable data are available). As a point 
9  The reference ‘standardized’ worker is at least 20 years 
of age, has no work experience and works in an unskilled 
occupation in a non-metropolitan area. This worker is expected 
to earn the lowest minimum wage for an adult worker in each 
agreement (Skedinger, 2010).
10  We refer to the poverty line at 60 percent of the median 
equivalized disposable income (Statistics Sweden, 2016). Net 
wages are gross wages multiplied by (1-t), where t is the sum of 
average income tax rate and average rate of employee’s social 
security contribution for a single person at 67% of average 
earnings with no child. Tax data come from OECD (2014).
of reference, we use the average for EU-27 from 
2005 on. By comparing how the trends differ 
between groups and depending on where the 
poverty line is drawn, we come to suggest that the 
increase in poverty can be better accounted for by 
recent redistributive policy (taxes and transfers)  
changes than by the presence of an inherent trade-
off between raising employment and decreasing 
poverty.
Poverty has many faces, and any attempt to define 
and measure it involves making difficult choices that 
necessarily involve value judgments (see Decancq 
et al. (2014) for an informed discussion on the 
available options). For the sake of comparability, we 
follow most poverty analyses for the EU by choosing 
household income as the metric of wellbeing, and 
by defining the poverty line in floating, relative 
and national terms (Decancq et al., 2014)11. Unless 
otherwise noted, we apply the EU headline ‘at-risk-
of-poverty’ indicator, which takes 60% of the median 
equivalized disposable household income as the 
poverty threshold. 
Figure 3 compares the at-risk-of-poverty rate 
in Sweden to the average of EU-27; for the total 
population and for those 65 or older, and at the 50 
and 60 percent of median income thresholds. The 
lower levels shown for Sweden at the beginning of 
the period are consistent with the stylized fact that 
the Swedish social investment oriented welfare state 
historically has performed better than the average 
EU Member State. However, the considerable 34 (47) 
percent increase in poverty at the 60 (50) percent 
threshold in Sweden between 2004 and 2014 calls for 
an explanation (we return specifically to the case of 
those 65 or older below).
Considering that statistics from Eurostat (2016b) 
indicate that the employment rate in Sweden 
(as well as the EU-27 average) has increased by 
2.5 percentage points over the period, the data 
seem at first glance to support the notion that an 
‘employment vs. poverty’ trade-off is in play. As 
mentioned above, this could occur either if the 
employment increase primarily takes place at wages 
that are below the poverty line or the previous out-
of-work income packages, or if new jobs primarily 
11  As noted by Decancq et al. (2014: 72), this approach differs 
from the American approach of setting a fixed, absolute, and 
pan-U.S. poverty line.
Axel Cronert & Joakim Palme 
Global Challenges • Working Paper Series / No. 4
11
benefit households which are already comparably 
‘work-rich’, thus boosting the median income, 
while the number of ‘work-poor’ households as well 
as the income of those households remains stable 
(Cantillon, 2011; de Beer, 2007). However, the fact 
shown above, that the amount of minimum wage 
work required to reach out of poverty has decreased 
markedly since the turn of the century, suggests that 
no low-wage strategy seems to be in play that could 
account for this development. 
But what about the distribution of employment 
among work-rich and work-poor households? In 
congruence with expectations from the social 
investment approach, Figure 4 demonstrates that 
Sweden has a lower share of people in the ages 0–59 
living in households with very low (<0.2), low (0.2–
0.45), or medium (0.45–0.55) work intensity than 
the EU-27, and a higher share at the higher work 
intensities12. The differences are particularly striking 
at the lower end of the distribution: In 2014, the 
probability of living in a household with low or very 
low work intensity was twice as high in the EU-27 
as in Sweden for this age group. Moreover, while the 
data for the EU-27 confirm Cantillon’s (2011) finding 
about the overall lack of reduction in the number 
of work-poor households, Sweden stands out by 
seeing a sizeable 26 percent reduction in the share 
of households with very low work intensity, down 
from 8.5 percent in 2004 to 6.3 percent in 2014. Lack 
12  Eurostat (2014) defines the work intensity of a 
household as “the ratio of the total number of months that 
all working-age household members have worked during 
the income reference year and the total number of months 
the same household members theoretically could have 
worked in the same period”.
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of data on flows prevents us from knowing if these 
households moved further up in the work intensity 
distribution than to the next level and how many 
of their members simply grew older than 59 and 
left the studied population; but there is little from 
our results to indicate that employment expansion 
in Sweden has primarily benefitted work-rich 
households. Indeed, according to estimates by Gabos 
et al. (forthcoming) for roughly the same period, 
the reduction of jobless households in Sweden has 
had a slight negative effect on the poverty rate. 
This suggests that the explanation of the increased 
poverty rate needs to be sought elsewhere.
Before continuing that search, let us turn to Figure 
5, which disaggregates the at-risk-of-poverty rate 
by the level of work intensity of the household, 
for an illustration of the importance of high and 
evenly distributed employment for the prevention 
of poverty in Sweden. Considering the lower overall 
at-risk-of-poverty rate in Sweden as compared to 
the EU-27 reported in Figure 3 above, it is rather 
paradoxical to find that when decomposed by level 
of work intensity of the household, the at-risk-of-
poverty rate in the population aged 0 to 59 years 
has now grown higher in Sweden than in EU-27 at 
four of the five levels of household work intensity 
reported by Eurostat (2016a) (only at WI 0.45–0.55 
the poverty rate is still marginally lower in Sweden). 
One way to interpret the results in Figure 5, when 
paired with those for work intensity in Figure 4, 
is that the lower overall at-risk-of-poverty rate 
in Sweden, when compared to the EU-27, is at 
least partly due to Sweden’s success in promoting 
employment at decent wages and in achieving 
a comparably even distribution of work across 
households. Rather than there being a lower risk of 
poverty at any given level of work intensity, it seems 
to be the fact that a larger share of the Swedish 
population resides in households with higher levels 
of work intensity, which accounts for the lower 
overall at-risk-of-poverty rate in Sweden13. 
Figure 5 also hints at what we suggest is one of 
the key explanations for the increase of poverty in 
Sweden during the period; namely the reductions 
in the level of protection provided by the 
unemployment insurance, sickness insurance and 
social assistance system, as discussed in section 
3.1. The lower the work intensity of a household, 
the larger the share of the household’s disposable 
income that comes from the social insurance 
systems tends to be, and the larger relative impact 
the reduction in benefit generosity should have on 
the at-risk-of-poverty14. And indeed, while the at-
risk-of-poverty rate for Swedish households with a 
very low work intensity more than doubled between 
2004 and 2014, from 31 to 66.5 percentage points, 
13  A naïve calculation illustrates that if Sweden in 2014 would 
simply change its distribution of households across the work 
intensity intervals to that of the EU-27 (Figure 4), but retain the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate specific to each work intensity interval 
(Figure 5), the overall at-risk-of-poverty rate would be 49 
percent higher for this age group (up from 13.4 to 19.9 percent).
14  For instance, the aforementioned reduction in the social 
assistance scale rate from 60 to less than 50 percent of the 
median wage implies that long-term recipients of social 
assistance are much more likely to show up as poor in the 
income data. This probably explains part of the recent increase 
in poverty at the 50 percent threshold shown in Figure 3 
(Fritzell et al., 2013).
Figure 5. At-risk-of-poverty rate by work intensity of the household, 2004 – 2014. Refers to the population in 
the ages 0-59. For details regarding the calculation of work intensity (WI), see fn. 13. At-risk-of-poverty is at the 60 
percent threshold. Source: Eurostat (2016a).
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of data on flows prevents us from knowing if these 
households moved further up in the work intensity 
distribution than to the next level and how many 
of their members simply grew older than 59 and 
left the studied population; but there is little from 
our resul s to indicate that employm nt expansion 
in Sw den has primarily benefitted work-rich 
households. Indeed, according to estimates by Gabos 
et al. (forthcoming) for roughly the same period, 
the reduction of jobless households in Sweden has 
had a slight negative effect on the poverty rate. 
This suggests that the explanation of the increased 
poverty rate needs to be sought elsewhere.
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population resides in households with higher levels 
of work intensity, which accounts for the lower 
overall at-risk-of-poverty rate in Sweden13. 
Figure 5 also hints at what we suggest is one of 
the key explanations for the increase of poverty in 
Sweden during the period; namely the reductions 
in the level of protection provided by the 
unemployment insurance, sickness insurance and 
social assistance system, as discussed in section 
3.1. The lower the work intensity of a household, 
the larger the share of the household’s disposable 
income that comes from the social insurance 
systems tends to be, and the larger relative impact 
the reduction in benefit generosity sh uld have on 
the at-risk-of-poverty14. And indeed, while the at-
risk-of-poverty rate for Swedish household  with a 
very low work intensity more than doubled between 
2004 and 2014, from 31 to 66.5 percentage points, 
13  A naïve calculation illustrates that if Sweden in 2014 would 
simply change its distribution of households across the work 
intensity intervals to that of the EU-27 (Figure 4), but retain the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate specific to each work intensity interval 
(Figure 5), the overall at-risk-of-poverty rate would be 49 
percent higher for this age group (up from 13.4 to 19.9 percent).
14  For instance, the aforementioned reduction in the social 
assistance scale rate from 60 to less than 50 percent of the 
median wage implies that long-term recipients of social 
assistance are much more likely to show up as poor in the 
income data. This probably explains part of the recent i crease 
in poverty at th  50 p rcent threshold shown in Figure 3 
(Fritzell et l., 2013).
Figure 5. At-risk-of-poverty rate by work intensity of the household, 2004 – 2014. Refers to the population in 
the ages 0-59. For details regarding the calculation of work intensity (WI), see fn. 13. At-risk-of-poverty is at the 60 
percent threshold. Source: Eurostat (2016a).
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it has grown by no more than 17 percent, or 0.8 
percentage points, for the households with very high 
work intensity (which in 2014 comprised 66 percent 
of the population aged 0–59). As shown in the right 
panel, for the EU-27 the relative increase in poverty 
has been much more evenly distributed across levels 
of work intensity (ranging from 10 to 20 percent).
Figure 6 above lends additional support to this 
interpretation. It plots the at-risk-of-poverty rate 
before social transfers, as well as the percentage point 
difference between the at-risk-of poverty rates before 
and after social transfers (Eurostat, 2016a). Although 
the indicator of at-risk-of-poverty before transfers 
should be interpreted with caution, Figure 6 
provides a basic indication that the increasing post-
transfer poverty rates in Sweden reflect a decrease in 
the poverty-reducing capacity of the social transfers, 
rather than an increase in pre-transfer poverty 
rates, which would have been expected by those 
who believe in a trade-off between employment 
and poverty. Indeed, the before-transfer at-risk-
of-poverty rate actually saw a slight decline over 
the period, which might be related to the fact that 
minimum wages have grown faster than median 
disposable income.
The second mechanism that we argue is particularly 
important for understanding the increased overall 
at-risk-of-poverty rate in Sweden is the introduction 
of the EITC (Jobbskatteavdrag) in 2007. This 
mechanism can be demonstrated by returning to 
the comparison of the at-risk-of-poverty rates at 
the 50 and 60 percent thresholds for people aged 65 
or over, found in Figure 3 above. The comparison 
shows that the at-risk-of-poverty rate at the 60 
percent threshold saw a remarkable increase after 
2007, whereas the rate at the 50 percent threshold 
has been considerably more stable. This is puzzling, 
considering that the employment rate for people 
aged 65 or over has gradually increased (Eurostat, 
2016b) and that no major changes have been made 
to the pension system during the period. Our 
conjecture is that this development largely reflects 
the fact that the nominal median disposable income 
grew by 7 percent in 2007 as compared to around on 
average 3 percent annually the decade before. This 
increase, in turn, was driven to a large extent by the 
introduction and stepwise expansion of the EITC, 
which by its design in the Swedish case increases 
income for all persons with earnings, including the 
median worker, but does not apply to income from 
pensions (or other social transfers). These changes 
have mechanically pushed a large group of retirees 
below the 60 % at-risk-of-poverty threshold, while 
the at-risk-of-poverty rate at the 50 % threshold has 
been considerably more stable over the period. 
To sum up, the evidence put forward in this section, 
though certainly only correlational and with few 
alternative explanations discussed, is consistent with 
the following interpretation of the recent Swedish 
development. During the period studied here, 
Sweden has seen a modest increase in employment 
and a notable increase in poverty. However, the 
increases in employment have disproportionally 
occurred in households with lower degrees of work 
intensity, which is at odds with de Beer’s (2007) and 
Cantillon’s (2011) concern that social investments 
primarily benefit work-rich households. Moreover, 
minimum wages have grown faster than median 
wages, so the ‘employment vs. equality’ trade-off that 
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Figure 6. Pre-transfer at-risk-of-poverty rates, 2004 – 2014. Pre-AROP refers to at-risk-of-poverty rate (at 60%) 
before social transfers (excl. pensions). Reduction is pre-AROP less post-AROP (as shown in Figure 3). Source: Eurostat 
(2016a)
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is arguably in play in post-Hartz Germany does not 
seem as applicable here. Instead, considering that 
the cut-backs in the social insurance system have 
primarily affected those with a high proportion of 
non-market income, and that the EITC only applies 
(but broadly so) to market income, these reforms 
appear as more plausible explanations for the 
increase in poverty. Granted that social protection 
retrenchments and in-work benefits are distinctive 
to the Third Way approach to social investment, it 
is not the social investment agenda per se, but the 
shift from the Nordic approach to the Third Way 
approach which seems apt to account for the rise in 
poverty. 
4. A Europe-wide outlook
This subsection reports results from analyses of 
data for 24 European countries, to provide some 
preliminary evidence that the argument above, 
about social investments, employment, and poverty, 
extends outside Sweden. Consider first the three 
panels in Figure 7, which plots relationships between 
indicators averaged over the observed period for 
each of the 24 countries that go into our analyses15. 
From left to right, these graphs show (1) that a strong 
positive correlation (r = 0.74) exists between Social 
investment expenditure as share of GDP (Eurostat, 
2016c; classified as in Meeusen and Nys, 2012) and 
the Employment rate in ages 15-64 (Eurostat 2016b), 
and that both (2) Social investment expenditure and 
(3) Employment rate are negatively correlated with 
the overall At-risk-of-poverty rate at the 60 percent 
threshold (Eurostat, 2016a) (r = -0.56 and -0.58). 
While these findings are merely correlational, 
they are consistent with Hemerijck’s (2012a: 288) 
encompassing study, in which he concludes “that 
social investments are not successful merely in terms 
of stimulating employment participation, but also 
can actively keep social inequality at bay”.
The critical accounts reviewed above do not question 
these cross-country relationships as much as the 
favorable relationships between social investments, 
employment and poverty within countries over time. 
Exploring such relationships requires econometric 
15  The following 170 country-years are included: 2001–2011: 
NO; 2003–2011: AT, DK, IR; 2003–2010: BE; 2004–2011: 
FI, IT, PT, ES, SE; 2004–2010: EE, FR; 2004–2008: EL; 
2005–2011: DE, NL; 2005–2010: CZ, HU, LT, LV, PL, SK, UK; 
2006–2010: BG; 2007-2010: RO. 
analysis of panel data. The 24 country panels 
available here are short and unbalanced, which 
makes it difficult to estimate unbiased coefficients. 
Recent methodological advice on panels like these 
suggests applying a dynamic model with country-
fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable 
(FE-LDV) and then using Kiviet’s (1995) ‘LSDVc’ 
procedure to correct the biased coefficients from 
the FE-LDV model (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). 
Table 1 reports the results from three such LSDVc 
estimations, in which the dependent variable is the 
At-risk-of-poverty rate at the 60 percent threshold 
(Eurostat, 2016a). Each model has a control for the 
share of Elderly (aged 65 or above) in the population 
and Real GDP growth (Armingeon et al., 2015).
The results from Model 1 suggest, in line with the 
critical accounts, that there is, on average, a positive 
and significant within-country association between 
Employment rate and the At-risk-of poverty rate. 
This result holds in Model 2, which includes two 
indicators on the Replacement rate of unemployment 
insurance benefits for a production worker with a 
dependent family (Scruggs et al., 2014) and Social 
investment expenditure as a share of GDP (Eurostat, 
2016c).
However, the results from the full specification in 
Model 3 indicate rather – in line with our argument 
– that the effect of employment on poverty varies 
across countries depending on the wage structure of 
that country. This feature is modelled by means of 
including an interaction term between Employment 
rate and a measure of the Centralization of wage 
bargaining (CWB) (Visser, 2015), which, although a 
crude proxy for wage compression, is known to be 
negatively related to market income inequality16. The 
interaction coefficient is negative, and according to 
estimations plotted in Figure 8, the model suggests 
that the relationship between Employment rate and 
At-risk-of-poverty is positive and significant only in 
the context of low Centralization of wage bargaining 
(a CWB score of 2 or less; which is typically observed 
in the United Kingdom and in Central and Eastern 
Europe). When centralization is higher, which is the 
case for most of Europe, the association cannot be 
16  Based on 117 available observations from 18 OECD 
countries between 1967 and 2010, there is a -0.31 (p = 0.007) 
correlation between the Gini index on market income before 
taxes and transfers (Armingeon et al., 2015) and the CWB 
indicator (Visser, 2015). 
Axel Cronert & Joakim Palme 
Global Challenges • Working Paper Series / No. 4
15
distinguished from zero. These findings are in line 
with our arguments above. Also consistent with 
our argument, both Models 2 and 3 report negative 
and significant coefficients for Replacement rate of 
unemployment insurance benefits and non-positive 
(but insignificant) coefficients for Social investment 
expenditure. However, these kinds of investment 
expenditures are likely to have effects primarily in 
the longer run (cf. Lindh and Palme, 2006, for an 
analysis and discussion of the long-term effects of 
education expenditures on economic growth).
5. Discussion
With regard to the ongoing discussion about the 
implications of social investments for employment 
and poverty, the results presented in this paper 
highlight a number of important phenomena.  By 
comparing countries and examining the Swedish 
development over time, it illustrates the relevance of 
distinguishing between different social investment 
approaches. The simultaneous examination of the 
development of the Swedish policy paradigm and 
the relationship between employment and poverty, 
pinpoints the importance of the wage formation 
system. The role of the wage formation process 
has not been adequately recognized in social 
investment literature, but we have tried to take steps 
in the direction to remedy this omission. Here we 
could observe that wage coordination also appears 
important in the wider European context. The 
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Figure 7. Cross-country correlations between social investment, employment, and poverty. Indicators 
averaged for various years; see fn. 16. Sources: Eurostat (2016a; 2016b; 2016c).
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Table 1. Dynamic panel-data models of at-risk-of-poverty rates in Europe, ca. 2005 – 2011
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Lagged dependent variable 0.47*** (0.09) 0.42*** (0.09) 0.41*** (0.09)
Employment rate 0.16*** (0.05) 0.14*** (0.05) 0.32*** (0.10)
Elderly population 0.42* (0.25) 0.40 (0.28) 0.39 (0.27)
Real GDP growth -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Replacement rate of UI benefits -5.81*** (2.24) -5.53** (2.17)
Social investment expenditure -0.23 (0.48) -0.05 (0.46)
Centralization of wage bargaining 6.17** (2.80)
Employment rate × CWB -0.09** (0.04)
Observations (N = 24 countries) 147 147 147
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Bruno’s (2005) LSDVc estimator is applied. Bias correction initialized by Arellano and Bond estimator.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bruno’s (2005) estimator do 
not support clustered standard errors, but comparing clustered and non-clustered FE-LDV models, we find that 
clustering does not matter for the inferences.
However, the results from the full 
specification in Model 3 indicate rather –
in line with our argument – that the 
effect of employment on poverty varies 
across countries depending on the wage 
structure of that country. This feature is 
modelled by means of including an
interaction term between Employment 
rate and a measure of the Centralization 
of wage bargaining (CWB) (Visser, 
2015), which, although a crude proxy for 
wage compression, is known to be 
negatively related to market income 
inequality17. The interaction coefficient 
is negative, and according to estimations plotted in Figure 8, the model suggests that the 
relationship between Employment rate and At-risk-of-poverty is positive and significant only 
in the context of low Centralization of wage bargaining (a CWB score of 2 or less; which is 
typically observed in the United Kingdom and in Central and Eastern Europe). When 
centralization is higher, which is the case for most of Europe, the association cannot be 
distinguished from zero. These findings are in line with our arguments above. Also consistent
with our argument, both Models 2 and 3 report negative and significant coefficients for
Replacement rate of unemployment insurance benefits and non-positive (but insignificant)
coefficients for Social investment expenditure. However, these kinds of investment 
expenditures are likely to have effects primarily in the longer run (cf. Lindh and Palme, 2006,
for an analysis and discussion of the long-term effects of education expenditures on economic 
growth).
                                                     
17 Based on 117 available observations from 18 OECD countries between 1967 and 2010,
there is a -0.31 (p = 0.007) correlation between the Gini index on market income before taxes 
and transfers (Armingeon et al., 2015) and the CWB indicator (Visser, 2015).  
Figure 8. Interaction plot based on Model 3
Dashed lines mark a 95 % confidence interval.
Table 1. Dynamic panel-data mod ls of at-risk-of-poverty rates in Europe, ca. 20 5 – 2011. Bruno’s (2005) 
LSDVc estimator is applied. Bias correction initialized by Arellano and Bond estimator. Bootstrapped standard errors 
in pare theses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bruno’s (2005) estimator do not support clustered standard 
errors, but comparing clustered and non-clustered FE-LDV models, we find that clustering does not matter for the 
inferences.
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social insurance for reducing poverty. 
Behind a largely unchanged scope of total social 
policy expenditure, Sweden has seen a clear 
recasting of its policy paradigm.  While supply side 
policies to promote labor force participation have 
been expanded, the investment content of the policy 
portfolio has been diluted and the social protection 
systems for the working-age population have been 
retrenched. We see this as a move away from the 
Nordic approach towards a Third Way approach 
to social investment. Still, a larger proportion of 
Swedes live in households with high employment 
intensity, which accounts for the lower overall 
poverty rate in Sweden. The dilution of social 
investment expenditures, in particular ALMP, might 
erode this formula. The policy shift is not reserved to 
social investment programs but can also be observed 
for the transfer programs. Increasing poverty 
rates in Sweden reflect a decrease in the poverty-
reducing capacity of the social transfers, rather than 
an increase in pre-transfer poverty rates, which 
would have been expected by those who believe in a 
trade-off between employment and poverty. On the 
contrary, the before-transfer at-risk-of-poverty rate 
has actually slightly declined.
Our findings shed new light on a contested empirical 
issue concerning the social investment approach, at 
least with respect to the case of Sweden: the alleged 
trade-off between spending on social protection and 
social promotion, and the economic sustainability 
of the social investment state. The way that the 
EITC was introduced in Sweden in 2007 serves as 
an illustration. We observed that the EITC has been 
far from self-financed and that it is difficult to assess 
with precision the importance of its expansion for 
increasing employment, preventing in-work poverty, 
and bolstering aggregate demand in Sweden. Yet it 
is in any event evident that the fiscal conditions of 
the Swedish public finances over the past ten years 
– marked by a severe financial crisis – did allow for 
planned tax revenue cuts amounting to 3.5 times 
the size of the national budget for ALMP. This, we 
suggest, indicates that the steps recently taken, away 
from the Nordic path of social investment towards 
the Third Way, are not singlehandedly a result of 
economic necessity or any inescapable trade-off 
between poverty reduction today and investments 
for tomorrow, but also a matter of political choice. 
In an EU context, the scope for political choice is 
obviously more limited in countries in southern 
Europe, and Ireland for that matter, which have been 
experiencing a sovereign debt crisis in the wake of 
the global financial crisis. Coming years will tell how 
the scope of political choice in Sweden is affected by 
real or posed economic pressures resulting from the 
record high influx of migrants during 2014 and 2015. 
The ongoing debate features a wide array of policy 
proposals targeting the newly arrived migrants, 
ranging from lower entry-level wages and more 
restrictive access to social security benefits, to tax 
credits for certain service sector jobs, expansions of 
ALMP measures to promote language training and 
subsidized employment, and larger state grants to 
municipalities to meet increased demand for schools 
and housing. To judge from the results in this paper, 
it appears that this debate illustrates that Sweden is 
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Figure 8. Interaction plot based on Model 3. 
Dashed lines mark a 95 % confidence interval.
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